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ABSTRACT 
Using a rich administrative dataset on unemployment insurance benefit 
recipients, the current work analyses the Spanish 1992 Reform Act 
implemented to reduce the generosity of the unemployment compensation 
system –in particular, a decrease in the level of unemployment insurance 
benefits and in entitlement duration. For this purpose, we compare 
unemployment insurance exit rates for two large sub-samples of individuals: the 
first sub-sample includes those who started receiving unemployment insurance 
benefits in 1991 (the pre-reform sub-sample) and the second sub-sample 
includes those who did so during 1993 (the post-reform sub-sample). Results 
indicate that these legislative changes had a positive though modest effect on 
individuals’ exit rate from unemployment: the 10-percent decrease in 
unemployment insurance benefit levels was associated with a 5-percent increase 
in the transition rate out of unemployment, while the reduction implemented in 
the potential unemployment insurance duration implied a 2-percent increase in 
the hazard rate out of unemployment. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: J63, J64, J65, J68. 
Keywords: labour reforms, benefit cuts, unemployment insurance, discrete-
time duration models, administrative dataset. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, the Spanish Government decided to implement a significant reform 
of the unemployment protection system (22/1992 Reform Act). The 
Government was convinced that the possibility of linking short-term 
employment contracts with unemployment benefit periods was one reason for 
the financial strains experienced by the system, along with the idea that the 
latter was too generous, and that this explained the resistance of the 
unemployment rate against any downturn despite employment growth –the 
unemployment rate was less than 5 percent in 1973, but it had already reached 
levels above 15 percent after the 1992 crisis. In particular, the Reform reduced 
both the level of benefits –from 80 percent to 70 percent during the first six 
months of benefits receipt, and from 70 percent to 60 percent from the seventh 
to the twelfth month of benefit receipt– and unemployment insurance (UI) 
entitlement, apart from lengthening its minimum contribution period. While 
before the reform job losers with at least 6 months of contribution to Social 
Security along the prior 48 months were entitled to UI –and each successive 
period of 6 months’ contributions implied 3 additional months of UI benefit 
receipt– after the reform the minimum contribution period was raised to 12 
months during the prior 72 months (the new reference period), and each 
successive period of 6 months’ contributions was to provide 2 additional months 
of benefits. As a result, for example, before the reform, workers with 25 to 30 
months of work experience were eligible for benefits for up to 12 months; after 
the reform, these workers were eligible either for 8 months (if work experience 
was below 30 months) or for 10 months (for those with 30 months of 
experience). 
What have been the labour market effects of this reform? In principle, one 
would expect it to have increased the outflow from unemployment, or, more 
precisely, to have increased the beneficiaries’ probability of exiting from 
unemployment compared with those not enjoying such benefits. Figure 1 shows 
annual mean coverage rates of the UI system and unemployment rates from 
1990 to 2006. As can be observed, after the reform, the coverage rate 
experienced a decrease of around 20 percent and, across the period 1994-
1998, it reached levels similar to the period before the reform (of around 50 
percent). 
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Figure 1 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
COVERAGE RATE (annual means) 
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Source:   Labour Force Survey (EPA), Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, and authors’ own 
elaboration. 
 
Based on this change in Spanish UI benefit law, the current contribution is 
the first one to analyse the effects of this reform on individuals’ job finding rates, 
by providing evidence on the effectiveness of both a cut in UI benefit levels and 
a reduction in UI entitlement. We study the length of UI spells before and after 
these legislative changes with an administrative dataset from the Spanish Public 
Employment Agency (INEM, Instituto Nacional de Empleo), which provides 
information on the length of individual UI benefit spells and various relevant 
individual and labour market characteristics in order to identify the impacts of 
the reform on UI recipients’ unemployment duration. 
A well-known result in the literature on the unemployment compensation 
system is the fact that such system provides a disincentive effect for job-seeking, 
which is affected by the level of UI (relative to the expected wage) and by the 
potential UI duration (Mortensen, 1977). On the one hand, the duration of an 
unemployment spell is expected to increase with the level of unemployment 
benefits because the cost of rejecting a job offer decreases –see Atkinson 
(1987), Atkinson et al (1991) or Layard et al. (1991) for excellent surveys on this 
issue. Strong incentive effects arising from benefit cuts have been found, for 
instance, by Abbring et al. (2003) and Van den Berg et al. (1998) in the 
Netherlands, and by Carling et al. (2001) in Sweden. In contrast, Hunt (1995) 
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finds no robust effects of benefit cuts in Germany. On the other hand, the 
disincentive effect provided by UI is also determined by the potential duration of 
benefits. As the date approaches when benefits will expire, the reservation 
wage decreases, unemployed workers tend to increase the intensity of their job 
search and the rate of job finding increases. Thus, establishing a limit to the 
duration of benefits tends to speed up the job search process. Evidence on the 
effect of extended benefit entitlement is mixed. While Hunt (1995) for 
Germany, Lubyova and Van Ours (1997) for Slovakia and Lalive et al. (2007) for 
Austria find substantial disincentive effects of extended benefit entitlement 
periods, most of research has found notable incentive effects arising from fixed 
UI periods –see, e.g., Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer (1990) or Card and Levine 
(2000) for the U.S., Carling et al. (1996) for Sweden, Adamchik (1999) for 
Poland and Roed et al. (2003) for Norway. However, other streams of research 
find no clear evidence of increases in the hazard out of unemployment as 
exhaustion of benefits approaches such as e.g. Stancanelli (1999) for Britain, 
Puhani (2000) for Poland, Bratberg and Vaage (2000) for Norway. 
In contrast to this research, however, in Spain there exist very few studies on 
the effects of UI on unemployment duration, and none on the impact of the 
22/1992 Reform Act (which is the latest reform on the unemployment 
compensation system in this country1). Therefore, by focusing on the legislative 
changes implemented in this Act, the present paper adds to the knowledge of 
the potential disincentive effects arising from unemployment benefits. Some 
previous works on the disincentive effects arising from the Spanish 
unemployment compensation are Alba-Ramirez (1999) or Bover et al. (2002). 
With the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA), they find a negative impact on the 
probability of leaving from unemployment arising from benefit receipt. Other 
studies, such as Cebrián et al. (1996) using data from the Spanish Public 
Employment agency, find that the benefit level exerts no clear negative influence 
on the job search behaviour of the unemployed. Finally, with the same dataset 
Jenkins and Garcia-Serrano (2004) find a small disincentive effect from UI 
benefits levels on the re-employment hazard on average, while Arranz and 
Muro (2004, 2007) find that the UI benefit level increases the unemployment 
hazard rates temporarily. In addition, both Jenkins et al. (2004) and Arranz et al. 
(2004, 2007) find that the hazard rates dramatically rise as the time to UI 
benefits exhaustion approaches. 
Our results show that the 1992 changes in the UI system had a positive effect 
on the exit rate from unemployment. In particular, we find that the 10 percent 
reduction in the UI benefit level increased the transition rate out of 
                                          
1  Table B in the appendix presents labour reforms on the Unemployment Compensation 
System (UCS) in Spain across the 80s and 90s. As can be observed, the 1992 reform is the 
last one that changed both UCS parameters (level and entitlement duration). 
  
— 10 — 
unemployment by 5 percent. We also find that the reduction of the potential 
duration of UI benefits had a positive effect on the exit rate from 
unemployment. These results are in line with many others in the 
aforementioned literature regarding the changes in survival and hazard rates 
associated with changes in the UI system. 
In the next section we describe the change in the Spanish UI system. In 
section 3, we describe our data set, the variables and present the descriptive 
analysis. The econometric model is presented in section 4. Section 5 shows the 
results and the last section concludes. 
2.   THE CHANGE IN THE SPANISH UI SYSTEM: THE 1992 UI 
2.   REFORM ACT 
As in most OECD countries, Spain provides income support to the 
unemployed via a social insurance program consisting of a combination of 
unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance benefits. Eligible for UI 
are workers whose unemployment situation is recognized according to law by 
the labour authority; i.e., the job was lost involuntarily, including end of a fixed-
term contract. The UI is financed with a payroll tax of about 7 percent, of which 
approximately 80 percent is charged on the employer and 20 percent on the 
employee; and it is not experienced rated. In april 1992, Spain reformed its 
unemployment benefit system by tightening eligibility to UI benefits in order to 
encourage UI recipients to leave from unemployment2. 
Whereas before the reform, eligibility required Social Security contributions 
for a minimum of six months during the four years preceding unemployment, 
under the new rules, eligibility requires Social Security contributions for a 
minimum of twelve months during the six years preceding unemployment. 
Moreover, after the reform, UI entitlement periods were shortened for all groups 
of recipients. Before the reform workers making contributions for 6-12 months 
were eligible for 3 months; a contribution of 13-18 months entailed 6 months, 
and so on to a maximum of 24 months for those who contributed to Social 
Security for more than 48 months (table 1). In contrast, after the amendments, 
workers who made contributions for 12-17 months are eligible for 4 months; a 
contribution of 18-23 months entails 6 months, and so on to a maximum of 24 
months for those contributing to Social Security for 72 months or longer. 
                                          
2  At the same time, support to unemployed through the UA system was widened. Given that 
in the current work we exclusively focus on the effects arising from the 1992 UI changes, we 
refer the reader to appendix A for a description of the changes introduced in the UA benefit 
system through the 1992 reform. 
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Table 1 
THE UCS IN SPAIN BEFORE AND AFTER 1992 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM BEFORE 1992* 
UA entitlement after UI exhaustion 
With family burdens Without family burdens
Contribution period (C)
(Over the last 4 years)
UI entitlement 
(2 × integer (C/3))
< 45 years ≥ 45 years <45 years ≥45 years
3 months — 3 months 3 months   
4 months — 4 months 4 months   
5 months — 5 months 5 months   
From 6 to 11 months 3 months 18 months 24 months — - 
From 12 to 17 months 6 months 24 months 30 months — — 
From 18 to 23 months 9 months 24 months 30 months — — 
From 24 to 29 months 12 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
From 30 to 35 months 15 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
From 36 to 41 months 18 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
From 42 to 47 months 21 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
More than 48 months 24 months 24 months 6+30 
months 
— 6+6 
months 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM AFTER 1992** 
UA entitlement after UI exhaustion 
With family burdens. Without family burdens
Contribution period (C)
(over the last 6 years)
UI entitlement 
(2 × integer (C/6))
< 45 years ≥45 years <45 years ≥45 years
3 months — 3 months 3 months — — 
4 months — 4 months 4 months — — 
5 months — 5 months 5 months — — 
From 6 to 11 months — 21 months 21 months 6 months 6 months
From 12 to 17 months 4 months 18 months 24 months — — 
From 18 to 23 months. 6 months 24 months 30 months — — 
From 24 to 29 months. 8 months 24 months 30 months — — 
From 30 to 35 months. 10 months 24 months 30 months — — 
From 36 to 41 months. 12 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
From 42 to 47 months. 14 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
(Follows) 
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(Continuation) 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM AFTER 1992** 
UA entitlement after UI exhaustion 
With family burdens. Without family burdens
Contribution period (C)
(over the last 6 years)
UI entitlement 
(2 × integer (C/6))
< 45 years ≥45 years <45 years ≥45 years
From 48 to 53 months. 16 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
From 54 to 59 months. 18 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
From 60 to 65 months. 20 months 24 months 30 months — 6 months
From 66 to 71 month. 22 months 24 months 30 months —- 6 months
72 months or longer 24 months 24 months 6+30 
months 
— 6+6 
months 
Notes:  (*) Eligibility to UI requires Social Security contributions for a minimum of six months 
during the four years preceding unemployment. UI entitlement duration was the result of 
dividing by 2 the number of months of contribution, with the constrain that the result has to 
be an integer multiple of 3 (ranging from 3 to 24 months). 
(**)  Eligibility to UI required Social Security contributions for a minimum of twelve months 
during the six years preceding unemployment. UI entitlement duration was the result of 
dividing by 3 the number of months of contribution. The result was constrained to be an 
integer multiple of 2 (ranging from 4 to 24 months). 
 
The amount of UI is determined as a fraction of the average “regulatory 
base” during a determined period of time preceding unemployment, where the 
regulatory base is the gross earnings used to calculate contributions to UI. Apart 
from enlarging the period for which this average wage is computed (6 months 
before the reform and 12 months after the reform), a second notable feature of 
the reform is a reduction in the level of UI benefits during the first 12 months of 
UI receipt. Before the reform, it was 80 percent during the first six months of 
unemployment, 70 percent from the seventh to the twelfth month of 
unemployment, and 60 percent from the thirteenth month onwards. After the 
reform, on the contrary, the amount of UI is 70 percent during the first six 
months of unemployment, and 60 percent the remaining period of eligibility. 
UI receipts were exempt from income tax until 1994. However, in this year, UI 
was made liable to income tax. Moreover, the notion of family responsibility was 
tightened, and more restrictive instructions were given to unemployment benefit 
officers. The result of these changes was a severe drop in the system’s coverage 
rate. As figure 1 shows, by 1995, such a rate was almost back to its 1990 level, 
although it appears to have increased from then on. Finally, the minimum and 
maximum UI benefits were changed; prior to 1994, UI were subject to a 
minimum equal to the statutory minimum wage (SMW, around 40 percent of the 
average wage) and a maximum equal to 170 percent of the SMW for those with 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
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no dependent children, which could be increased to 190 percent and 220 percent 
if the unemployed had one or more dependent children. From 1994, the 
minimum amount of UI was established at 75 percent of the statutory minimum 
wage (SMW) if the worker has no dependent children, unless the beneficiary had 
dependent children, in whose case a 100 percent of SMW remained. 
As a general assessment, before 1992, the Spanish UI system was rather 
generous. Indeed, the maximum replacement rate among workers eligible for 
UI amounted to 80 percent of previous earnings. This figure was among the 
most generous replacement rates in Europe (only behind that of Sweden, with a 
90 percent replacement rate in the early nineties). Table 2 shows the 
distribution of net replacement rates before and after 19923. As expected, 
replacement rates were substantially higher in the pre-reform sub-sample; while 
87.16 percent of individuals enjoyed a net replacement rate above 85 percent in 
such sub-sample, this only occurred for 15.63 percent of individuals in the post-
reform sub-sample. In addition, as can be observed in Figure 1, from 1990 to 
1993, the coverage rate experienced a substantial increase, which is noticeably 
larger then the increase in unemployment rates for such a three-year period4. 
Such generosity accentuates if we compare the Spanish UI system to other EU 
and OECD countries. This is suggested by the cross-country analysis by the 
OECD (1991) of gross replacement rates for ‘average production worker levels 
of 1988 earnings’ for a new entrant to UI. Of the countries considered, only 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands had similar or higher rates to Spain 
(OECD, 1991, p. 201). Spanish UI coverage was also substantial from a cross-
national perspective: Blanchard et al. (1995, pp. 135) report that ‘along with 
France, Holland, Belgium and Germany, Spain had the highest gross coverage 
rate in the EU in 1992’. Another relevant factor is the relatively non-stringent 
requirements for job search during the UI receipt period: signing-on to confirm 
unemployment status is required in person, but only every 3 months (OECD, 
1991, p. 214). Blanchard et al. (1995, pp. 135) also state that ‘individuals that 
repeatedly turn down [job] offers retain their rights to continue claiming 
unemployment benefits, which clearly acts as a disincentive for leaving 
unemployment’. 
                                          
3  Gross replacement rates have also been computed and are available from the authors upon 
request. 
4  According to Government’s own calculations coverage rates were over 100 per cent in 
early 1993. The reason for this may be attributed to the fact that some unemployment 
beneficiaries were not counted as registered unemployed (that such a rate is defined as the 
proportion of UI beneficiaries over registered unemployment). In any case, it provides an 
indication that the coverage of the system was high, certainly higher than it had been a few 
years before (see Toharia et al., 2000). 
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Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF NET UI REPLACEMENT RATES BEFORE AND AFTER 1992 
Pre-reform Post-reform 
Replacement rate 
Freq % Freq % 
>=0.45 &<0.5 328 10.78 609 1.7 
>=0.5 & <0.6 747 11.78 1,304 3.64 
>=0.6 & <0.7 1,102 12.62 1,573 4.39 
>=0.7 & <0.75 591 11.41 3,031 8.46 
>=0.75 & <0.8 857 12.04 10,280 28.68 
>=0.8 &<0.85 1,772 14.22 13,440 37.49 
>=0.85 &<0.9 14,137 33.64 3,998 11.15 
>=0.9 &<0.95 14,108 33.57 740 2.06 
>=0.95 &<1 2,755 16.55 145 0.4 
≈1 5,632 13.41 725 2.02 
Total sample 42,029 100 35,845 100 
Source:   HSIPRE and own authors’ calculations. 
3.   DATA, VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE 
3.   ANALYSIS 
3.1.   The data 
The data have been extracted from the HSIPRE (Histórico del Sistema Integrado 
de Prestaciones), a Spanish administrative data set from the Spanish Public 
Employment Agency that provides information on unemployment benefits 
received by each worker5. It registers claims of UI and UA by unemployed 
workers –including some individuals partially unemployed (i.e. on short time 
work). The dataset contains information on individual spells of benefit receipt 
collected at the moment of entry into the UCS. Information refers not only to 
individual characteristics (age, gender, family burdens, and region where the 
                                          
5  HSIPRE data have also been used to analyse the exit from unemployment by Cebrián et al. 
(1996), and García-Serrano (1997). However both studies focus on a single cohort of UI 
entrants in june 1990. Other works using the HSIPRE data are Jenkins and García-Serrano 
(2004) for the period 1987-1993, and Arranz and Muro (2004) for the period 1987-1997. 
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benefit is paid) and benefit parameters (starting and ending dates of registered 
unemployment, the number of days granted for benefits, the number of days of 
benefit receipt and the benefit level), but also to some important features of 
former employment relationships: the duration of the previous job, the reason for 
leaving the last job, the former job category (i.e., a proxy for the occupation held 
and the level of education), and the individual’s former wage. 
The data we have is a 40-per cent representative random sample of all 
unemployed workers who started their UI spell either in February, June, or 
November along the period 1987-1997. We have only selected individuals fully 
unemployed, in the sense that those who entered unemployment due to either 
temporary layoffs or short-time work have been excluded from the analysis. 
Moreover, individuals included have an entitlement period consistent with the 
legal provisions, and non-missing data on regression covariates. Finally, we have 
excluded self-employment (so as to avoid problems associated with previous 
employment status). 
From this dataset, given its large size and the object of our analysis, we 
extracted two random sub-samples by selecting individuals between 18 and 59 
years-old6 who started receiving UI in 1991 (for the first sub-sample) and in 
1993 (for the second sub-sample). Thus, we compare a group of unemployed 
who were affected by the UI rule change with another consisting of individuals 
who were not. The reason for excluding the year 1992 is to avoid a potential 
selection bias in choosing “before and after” comparison groups7. Thus, in order 
to avoid biased estimates, we do not consider data for the year 1992 (see, in 
this respect, van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). 
Therefore, the final sub-samples include every spell of UI benefits receipt for 
two groups of individuals, one of which started receiving UI benefits in 1991 
(amounting to 42,029 individuals), whereas the other one did so in 1993 (which 
includes 35,845 individuals). Due to its administrative nature, the dataset is free 
of problems common in survey data (such as non-response and interviewer 
bias). Thus, its quality is deemed to be high (Jenkins et al., 2004; Arranz and 
Muro, 2004, 2007). In addition, it is the only Spanish administrative dataset with 
information about UI benefit level, previous earnings, entitlement periods and 
elapsed UI duration. One limitation, however, is that there is no information on 
the period after benefits are expired, but only on the period during which 
                                          
6  This age limit is established in order to avoid complications associated with early 
retirement. 
7  Arranz and Muro (2004) find that while an increase in inflows into unemployment occurred 
just before 1992, a substantial reduction in inflows was observed in such a year. This suggests 
that expectations of the law’s introduction affected flows from employment into 
unemployment. 
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workers are receiving UI. Thus, we follow individuals until they the escape from 
covered unemployment or, at most, exhaust UI. 
Table 3 shows main descriptive statistics for both sub-samples (individual and 
spell characteristics). Individuals belonging to the post-1992 sub-sample (i.e., 
those making up the treatment group) are mainly men (55.8 percent) whereas 
in the pre-reform sub-sample the proportion of males is 49.8 percent. In 
addition, although the average age is rather similar across sub-samples (30.94 
for the former versus 29.20 for the latter), the main difference lies on the 
distribution for the first and the last age intervals: in the post-reform sub-sample 
there exists a lower proportion of individuals in the 18-25 age interval (36.1 
percent versus 42 percent) and a larger proportion among those beyond 50 
years-old. As regards former job category, individuals in the post-reform sub-
sample are more likely to having been hired in skilled positions (i.e., in job 
categories 1, 2 and 5), while the opposite occurs for the pre-reform sub-sample. 
As a consequence, net wages earned in the last job are slightly larger for the 
former (20.88 Є per day as opposed to 18.91 Є per day). Finally, UI benefit 
levels are rather similar across sub-samples (although slightly larger in the pre-
reform sub-sample), and in both groups individuals enter into unemployment 
mainly due to the end of the previous contract8. 
Table 3 
MAIN DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, BY SUB-SAMPLES 
Pre-reform Post-reform SAMPLE 
CHARACTERISTICS Mean Std Sample (%) Mean Std Sample (%)
Sex       
Male   49.8   55.8 
Female   50.2   44.2 
Job Category       
1. High levels & associate 
professional technicians, 
foremen & supervisors 
   
 
16.9 
   
 
18.9 
(Follows) 
                                          
8  The prevalence of temporary contracts is a notable feature of the Spanish labour market. 
These contracts were introduced in 1984 in order to increase labour market flexibility, and 
imply low firing costs (redundancy payments are lower than those for open-ended contracts). 
The use of fixed term contracts spread rapidly: “Between 1986 and 1990, 80% of all 
contracts registered at employment offices were fixed-term. By 1991, fixed-term and 
temporary employment accounted for nearly a third [...] of total employment” (Blanchard et al. 
1995, p. 128). See also Alba-Ramírez (1998). 
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(Continuation) 
Pre-reform Post-reform SAMPLE 
CHARACTERISTICS Mean Std Sample (%) Mean Std Sample (%)
2. Technical assistants and 
skilled clerical workers 
   
10.9 
   
13.7 
3. Semi skilled clerical 
workers 
   
13.4 
   
13.2 
4. Unskilled clerical workers   17.2   16.1 
5. Skilled production 
workers 
   
13.2 
   
15.7 
6. Semi skilled production 
workers 
   
17.5 
   
16.7 
7. Unskilled production 
workers 
   
30.9 
   
25.6 
Family burdens       
With   12.9   10.8 
Without   97.1   99.2 
Reason for leaving the last job       
End of contract   96.4   91.2 
Other reasons   13.6   18.8 
Age 29.20 10.12  30.94 10.89  
Age by groups        
≥18 & ≤25 years   42.1   36.1 
>25 & ≤35 years   33.8   33.0 
>35 & ≤50 years   17.4   21.8 
>51 years   16.8   19.1 
Benefits (euros per day, 
1990 prices) 
 
16.59 
 
13.88 
  
16.06 
 
15.07 
 
Net wage (euros per day, 
1990 prices) 
 
18.91 
 
16.84 
  
20.88 
 
18.70 
 
Gross wage (euros per day, 
1990 prices) 
 
22.06 
 
19.73 
  
25.33 
 
12.69 
 
Economic variables       
(Follows) 
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(Continuation) 
Pre-reform Post-reform SAMPLE 
CHARACTERISTICS Mean Std Sample (%) Mean Std Sample (%)
GDP quarterly rate 111.17 111.31 100.1 110.96 111.64 100.1 
Unemployment regional rate 117.77 115.84 100.1 122.43 115.45 100.1 
SPELL CHARACTERISTICS       
Type of observation       
Censored duration   77.5   173.1 
Completed duration   22.5   127.1 
Duration (days)       
Elapsed unemployment 
duration 
 
262.27
 
215.03
 
100.1 
 
289.38
 
209.82 
 
100.1 
Duration until exhaustion 156.57 143.15 100.1 173.80 163.53 100.1 
(Duration until exhaustion/10)2 236.94 779.82 100.1 321.90 918.14 100.1 
Entitlement Period       
Average duration (days) 318.84 227.92 100.1 363.19 225.70 100.1 
> 0 & ≤ 6 months 114.08 111.44 48.2 114.73 110.96 135.7 
> 6 & ≤ 15 months 111.50 112.38 25.4 110.43 112.08 132.7 
> 15 & ≤ 24 months 121.74 112.62 26.4 122.19 112.75 131.5 
Number of individuals 42,029 35,845 
Source:   HSIPRE and own authors’ calculations. 
 
As regards UI spell characteristics, both average elapsed unemployment 
duration (289.38 days) and entitlement duration (363.19 days) are larger in the 
post-1992 sub-sample. Moreover, UI entitlement spells are mainly shorter than 
6 months in both sub-samples, although this frequency is lower for the post-
1992 sub-sample (35.7 per cent versus 48.2). As regards the exit from covered 
unemployment, the percentage of censored observations (for which UI 
exhaustion takes place) is substantially high in both sub-samples: 77.5 percent 
for the pre-reform group and 73 percent for the post-reform sub-sample. 
3.2.   Variable definitions 
3.2.1.   Benefit-related variables 
We include as a covariate a dummy variable which indicates spells from the 
post-reform sub-sample (i.e., with 1993 as the inflow year into unemployment). 
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Thus, the reference group refers to individuals becoming unemployed during 
the year 1991 (prior to the reform). This variable –referred to as “After change 
of law”– measures any differences in UI leaving rates between post-reform UI 
spells and those in the comparison sub-sample (prior to the reform), during all 
months of these spells, and, therefore, the effect of the law change. Note that 
since we also control for changes in business cycle/labour market conditions –see 
below– the “pure” effect of the 1992 Law Act on UI leaving behaviour will be 
captured with this dummy variable. And any unobserved factors that happened 
to shift UI leaving rates after the policy change relative to the average rate in 
1991 will be absorbed by the unobserved heterogeneity component. 
Entitlement duration is likely to affect individuals’ job search effort and, 
therefore, their hazard rates out of unemployment –see, e.g., Mortensen (1977, 
1990), Van den Berg (1990) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) for surveys 
on this issue. First, as the worker is interested in maintaining her living standard, 
the absence of unemployment benefits will make her search for and accept jobs. 
Second, since the worker is no longer eligible, she has an additional interest in 
being hired and in remaining employed until she can re-qualify for 
unemployment benefits. Thirdly, since the moment at which one finds a job is 
not deterministic, workers will alter their behaviour well in advance of UI 
exhaustion: in anticipation of benefit exhaustion, workers will start searching for 
a job beforehand so as to preclude the income loss in the event that a job is not 
timely found. Thus, the likelihood of exiting from unemployment may be 
constant or decreasing during the earlier unemployment months, while 
substantially rising prior to benefit exhaustion (Meyer, 1990). In short, 
anticipation will gradually increase the employment hazard as one approaches 
the expiration rate. Thus, a disincentive effect may occur at the beginning of the 
unemployment period, whereas an incentive effect may arise at the end of such 
a period. In order to capture these effects, we use functions of the time until 
benefits lapse (see models 1 and 2 in table 7). We include time until benefit 
exhaustion dummy variables for a number of intervals covering months before 
benefits are expired. These variables are designated as “UI 19 to 24” through 
“UI 0”. Each of these time-varying exhaustion dummies takes on the value one 
in its designated interval and takes on the value cero in any other period –for 
instance, “UI 19 to 24” takes on the value one when the individual is 19 to 24 
months until exhaustion. 
In another specifications of the model (see models 3 and 4, in table 7) instead 
of including these functions, we have included an interaction term between the 
dummy “After change of law” and a variable which has been worked out as the 
difference between the pre-reform UI entitlement period and the post-reform 
UI entitlement period. This variable is named as “UI Entitlement Difference”. This 
variable along with the estimated impact from a variable named as “Pre-reform 
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entitlement duration” –which collects the potential entitlement duration 
according to the period before the Reform for both sub-samples– gives the 
impact on the hazard arising from a change in potential entitlement periods after 
the 1992 UCS Reform Act. In those specifications of the model, therefore, it is 
changes in entitlement duration that matter for UI recipients’ behaviour. 
The income received while in unemployment is also expected to have some 
influence on individuals’ job search effort. On the one hand, search effort may 
decrease as reservation wages increase when UI benefit levels are raised. This is 
the conventional disincentive effect: the receipt of UI benefits weakens search 
incentives, and increases the utility of unemployment (assuming that 
consumption and leisure are complements; see Mortensen’s (1977) dynamic 
stationary search model). On the other hand, an increase in UI benefit levels 
may lead to an increase in search effort, since UI might encourage the 
unemployed worker to allocate greater market expenditure on search activities, 
and may also increase the value of future unemployment spells (see, for 
instance, Tannery, 1983, or Ben Horim and Zuckerman, 1987). Thus, a two-fold 
impact is to be expected. In the estimations, we have included the level of 
benefits as a time varying covariate9. For the unemployed in the control group, 
the benefit level has been calculated by applying UI rules before the 1992 
Reform Act –i.e. 80 percent of previous average wage during the first six 
months of unemployment, 70 percent from the sixth to twelfth month of 
unemployment, and 60 percent for the remaining period of eligibility. For the 
unemployed in the treatment group, benefit levels were calculated by applying 
the UI rules after the 1992 Reform Act– i.e., 70 percent of the average wage 
during the first six months of unemployment, and 60 percent the remaining 
period of eligibility (see previous section 2). In both cases, the benefit level was 
converted to 1990 prices by using the retail price index (IPC, Índice de Precios al 
Consumo). Since the probability to accept a job depends on variables that affect 
reservation wages, we have included the net wage per month received in the 
last job. The use of this variable is common practice in studies based on 
administrative data (Meyer, 1990). Although it has some disadvantages 
(Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993, pp. 72), it is the only measure we could 
feasible derive. We calculate net wages from the gross wage (‘regulatory base’) 
                                          
9  Identification of UI benefit level effects separately from wage effects is possible even though 
UI receipts are related to previous earnings (given the rules described earlier). There are two 
potential sources of variation providing identification in addition to the usual functional form 
ones. First the proportionate relationship between earnings and benefits does not apply 
below the UI payment floor or above the UI payment ceiling. These bounds are relatively 
wide, however, and so the number of workers outside the cut-offs is not large. Therefore, 
we would like therefore to emphasise the separate time-series variation in each of the two 
series as a second source of identification. 
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information on the files by applying the tax rates applicable for a single person. 
This is justifiable since Spain has an independent taxation system. Figures were 
converted to prices by using the retail price index (IPC, Índice de Precios al 
Consumo). This variable reflects the incentive or disincentive effect on search and 
acceptance of job offers by the unemployed (see Lancaster, 1979; Hagen, 2003). 
The unemployed with a high (low) wage in the last job are expected to have a 
negative (positive) effect on the job finding rates, since they have a higher 
reservation wage (i.e., unemployed persons may prefer to wait for a suitable job). 
Hence, individuals with previous high-wage jobs may have longer unemployment 
duration and a reduced likelihood of re-entering into employment. In addition, 
previous high wages may also be associated to larger exit rates from UI: the 
reason being that previous income can be taken as a proxy for the cost of 
rejecting a job offer. Thus, a positive and significant effect from previous wages 
may be obtained, which would give support for the use of past wages as an 
opportunity cost proxy (see Bratberg and Vaage, 2000, pp.169). 
Finally, since changes in benefit levels are one of the key reform features, in 
another specifications of the model (see models 3 and 4 in table 7), we have 
included these changes (instead of the benefit level), through an interaction term 
between the dummy “After change of law” and a variable which has been 
worked out as the difference between the pre-reform level of benefits and the 
post-reform level of benefits. This variable –named as “UI Benefit Difference”– 
collects the 10-percent reduction in benefits level during the first twelve months 
of covered unemployment. Thus, this variable along with the estimated impact 
from a variable named as “Pre-reform UI Benefit level” –which collects the level 
of benefit levels according to the period before the Reform for both sub-
samples– gives the impact on the hazard arising from a change in benefit levels 
after the 1992 UCS Reform Act. 
3.2.2.   Control variables 
We control for demographic variables such as age at the start of the 
unemployment spell, using a non-linear specification distinguishing four age 
groups (18-25; 26-35; 36-50 and above 50 years-old). We also control for 
gender. 
The reason for entering unemployment may be an important explanatory 
factor of the job finding rate, since individuals who become jobless because of a 
temporary contract termination may start searching for a new job before 
entering into unemployment (as the date of contract expiry is known in 
advance). Moreover, they may be more accustomed to move from jobs. For 
these reasons, they are expected to leave unemployment earlier. In addition, 
the level of education and the occupation held in the last job are captured 
through seven professional category level from the National Insurance 
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contribution group. These categories have been classified in four groups: white 
collar skilled workers –category 1, (WCHS); clerical workers –categories 2, 3 
and 4 (WCLS); blue collar skilled workers –category 5 (BCHS); and blue collar 
unskilled workers –categories 6 and 7 (BCLS). Workers with higher qualification 
levels are expected to exit sooner from unemployment, since they may receive 
more job offers. 
Household conditions are taken into account through the existence of family 
burdens, which may be relevant in so far as they may affect reservation wages. 
On the one hand, having family burdens may increase job search effort and the 
willingness to accept a job offer. On the contrary, given that individuals who 
have family burdens may be entitled to UA once UI are exhausted, having family 
burdens may exert a negative impact on the job finding rate, as long as 
unemployed are able in this way to enlarge their unemployment compensation 
benefits. Family burdens are a rather broad concept, including any relative “of 
the second degree” as long as total per capita household income (i.e., the ratio 
between household income and the number of household members) is below 
the minimum wage. However, in 1993, this definition was restricted to the 
individual’s spouse and dependent children (and, therefore, for instance, 
beneficiary’s parents were excluded). 
Dummies for the seventeen Spanish Autonomous Communities capture the 
different regional labour markets in this country. Moreover, the influence of the 
business cycle is taken into account through the quarterly regional 
unemployment rate and the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, as time 
varying covariates. Workers in regions with lower regional unemployment rates 
(and therefore, a larger number of vacancies) are expected to enjoy a higher 
probability of finding a job; and a positive impact of the GDP growth rate on the 
exit rate from unemployment is expected. Seasonal effects are captured 
through a set of dummy variables which collect whether workers entered into 
unemployment in February, June and November. Finally, we control for the 
duration (in months) of the unemployment period by including dummy variables: 
i.e., the baseline hazard is estimated non-parametrically for each month 
(appendix B presents estimates of the baseline hazard). 
3.3.   Non-parametric analysis 
As a first approximation to the relationship between UI reform and 
unemployment duration, we present a non-parametric estimation of the time 
profile of the empirical hazards. Our analysis focuses on exists from UI to a job, 
and treats spells which end because of exhaustion of entitlement as censored. 
We compare the job-finding rates before and after the policy change in April, 
1992. Figure 2 shows the empirical hazard for the entire sample, separating pre-
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reform spells (beginning before the policy change) and post-reform spells 
(beginning after the policy change). Figure 3 displays hazard rates for males and 
females separately10. 
Figure 2 
EMPIRICAL HAZARD OUT OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Kaplan-Meier estimates) BY SUB-SAMPLES 
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As figure 2 shows, the policy change is associated with an increase in the 
hazard. Moreover, there are several periods where the empirical hazard is 
noticeably higher than surrounding periods in both figures. There is a high 
hazard in the first months, up to approximately 3-4 months, probably caused 
by the high concentration of short entitlement periods mentioned above. 
Jumps in months which are multiple of three are observed for the pre-reform 
sub-sample. These hazards are likely to be driven by the risk of benefit 
exhaustion. After Law changes, in contrast, peaks in the empirical hazard are 
obtained in months multiple of 2 (certainly due to the fact that entitlement 
                                          
10  Though not shown, Kaplan-Meier estimates have also been computed by age groups (they 
are available from the authors upon request). Young unemployed (between 18 and 25 years 
old) present higher hazard rates when compared both to the unemployed in the 26-35 and 
36-50 year-old intervals, and to the eldest individuals (above 50 years-old). We also 
appreciate that the unemployed after the 1992 reform present higher empirical hazard rates 
than those before the 1992 reform for whatever age group considered, except for those 
below 50 years old (for whom the rise in the hazard is only observed from the third month in 
unemployment onwards). 
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periods are multiple of 2 in this case). In addition (figure 3), males always 
present higher hazard rates than females independently of the time period 
considered. Therefore, as a first impression, the changes implemented in 1992 
are associated with individuals increasing their escape route out of 
unemployment. 
Figure 3 
EMPIRICAL HAZARD OUT OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Kaplan-Meier estimates) BY SUB-SAMPLES AND GENDER 
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Table 4 shows the “old” and “new” benefit entitlement periods, as well as 
the mean UI duration for individuals belonging to each contribution period. 
Thus, it shows how the reform affected the duration of unemployment under 
benefits –except for the first contribution period (from 6 to 11 months), given 
that individuals in this interval lost entitlement to benefits after the rule change. 
After the reform, the mean UI duration is shorter for any contribution period 
considered. Moreover (as expected), the larger the reduction in UI entitlement, 
the more intense the reduction in mean UI duration is. Similar information is 
provided in table 5. This table shows the cumulative probability of outflow from 
UI after 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 and 24 months of unemployment, before and 
after the change in the unemployment benefits law. The cumulative probability 
of having found a job within 3 and 6 months is slightly lower after the reform. 
However, it exponentially increases after Law changes for the remainder period 
of unemployment considered (both for men and for women). 
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Table 4 
UI ENTITLEMENT DURATION AND AVERAGE 
DURATION OF UI SPELLS, BY SUB-SAMPLES 
UI Entitlement 
duration (months) 
Mean duration of UI 
(months) Contribution period 
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform 
Difference 
(months) 
From 6 to 11 months 13 — 12.88 — — 
From 12 to 17 months 16 14 15.46 13.86 -1.60 
From 18 to 23 months. 19 16 17.88 15.57 -2.30 
From 24 to 29 months. 12 18 10.10 17.22 -2.88 
From 30 to 35 months. 15 10 12.12 18.95 -3.17 
From 36 to 41 months. 18 12 13.60 19.83 -3.77 
From 42 to 47 months. 21 14 14.97 11.24 -3.73 
From 48 to 53 months. 24 16 19.20 11.83 -7.37 
From 54 to 59 months. 24 18 19.20 13.49 -5.71 
From 60 to 65 months. 24 20 19.20 14.46 -4.74 
From 66 to 71 month. 24 22 19.20 14.74 -4.46 
72 months or longer 24 24 19.20 17.73 -1.47 
Source:   HSIPRE and own authors’ calculations. 
 
When interpreting these figures it is important to recognise that we compare 
two time periods with somewhat different labour market conditions for two 
different groups if individuals. The period 1987-1991 was characterised by an 
economic expansion, during which the number of salaried workers considerably 
increased in absolute terms (almost 1.5 millions in four years); whereas between 
1992 and 1994, a brief though intense recession took place (the total number of 
salaried workers reduced by almost half a million). In fact, regional 
unemployment rates in Spain subsequently fell from 1987 to 1991, to the extent 
that in most regions they were 5 percentage points lower in 1991 than in 1987. 
However, unemployment rates then increased again and reached 1987 levels by 
april 1993 (Jenkins and García-Serrano, 2004). Given these macroeconomic 
conditions, some decline in job finding rates should be expected. In spite of this, 
the opposite is observed in the post-reform period: an increase in job-finding 
rates. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the policy change may have caused 
an increase in job-finding rates. This result should be tempered by stressing the 
importance of controlling for the observed and unobserved characteristics of UI 
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claimants in each sub-sample. In particular, one cannot rule out the effect of 
changes in underlying conditions in the labour market. 
Table 5 
CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF EXITING FROM UI BENEFIT RECEIPT, 
BY SUB-SAMPLES AND BY UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION (in percentages) 
Duration of Unemployment Before change of Law After Change of Law 
TOTAL SAMPLE   
<=3 months 10.44 18.34 
<=6 months 18.73 17.32 
<=9 months 24.23 23.87 
<=12 months 28.53 30.68 
<=15 months 32.08 35.10 
<=18 months 35.06 39.52 
<=21 months 37.24 42.98 
<=24 months 39.84 49.27 
MEN   
<=3 months 17.96 15.72 
<=6 months 13.38 11.93 
<=9 months 17.28 16.24 
<=12 months 20.41 21.28 
<=15 months 22.67 24.18 
<=18 months 25.02 27.58 
<=21 months 26.36 29.99 
<=24 months 27.97 35.60 
WOMEN   
<=3 months 12.89 10.42 
<=6 months 23.76 21.41 
<=9 months 30.63 29.46 
<=12 months 35.98 37.26 
<=15 months 40.70 42.38 
<=18 months 44.25 47.16 
<=21 months 47.10 50.98 
<=24 months 50.44 57.28 
Source:   HSIPRE and own authors’ calculations. 
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To give a clear picture of how the potential duration of benefits affects the 
hazard rates before and after the reform, figure 5 plots both empirical hazards by 
time remaining to exhaustion of benefits. As job search theory predicts the hazard 
to rise as time to benefit exhaustion approaches, one would expect the 
percentage of unemployed exiting from unemployment to increase as UI 
exhaustion approaches, and those who do so after the reform to be a larger 
proportion of those before the reform. This, indeed, is observed in figure 5. It 
shows the empirical hazards before and after the reform for the entire sub-
sample, and for the following subgroups: individuals with entitlement durations 
less or equal than 6, 12 and 18 months. As can be observed, both before and after 
the reform the hazard tends to rise as benefits expiration occurs. This occurs for 
whatever entitlement groups are considered. The pre-reform and post-reform 
sub-samples do not markedly differ as regards these empirical hazards11. 
Figure 5 
BENEFIT EXPIRY EFFECT ON THE EMPIRICAL HAZARD RATES, BY GROUPS OF 
ENTITLEMENT DURATION (less than or equal 6, 12, 18 and 24 months) 
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11  In this figure we omit the percentage of individuals who exhaust benefits. The highest percentage 
of censored observations are for unemployed entitle to 6 months: slightly lower in the pre-reform 
period (81.5) than in the post-reform period (84). The rest of entitlement groups are always higher 
during the pre-reform period: entitlement periods of 12 months (71 pre-reform, 67 post-reform), 
18 months (60 pre-reform, 52 post-reform), 24 months (69.5 pre-reform, 57 post-reform). 
11  As regards the exit from covered unemployment, the percentage of censored observations 
(for which UI exhaustion takes place) is substantially high in both sub-samples: 77.5 percent 
for the pre-reform group and 73 percent for the post-reform sub-sample. 
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Figure 6 repeats the same exercise without aggregating entitlement periods. 
The empirical hazards are plotted for the following entitlement periods: 6, 12, 
18 and 24 months. In this case, the increase in the hazard is only detected for 
entitlement periods of 6 months. For longer entitlement periods, the figure 
does not provide clear evidence of increases in the hazards as exhaustion of 
benefits approaches. Indeed, for the groups of 12 and 24 months of entitlement, 
the percentage of unemployed who exit from unemployment decrease as the 
UI exhaustion approaches. 
Figure 6 
BENEFIT EXPIRY EFFECT ON THE EMPIRICAL HAZARD RATES, 
BY ENTITLEMENT DURATION (6,12, 18 and 24 months) 
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4.   ECONOMETRIC APPROACH: A DISCRETE-TIME DURATION 
4.   ANALYSIS 
The exit rates from unemployment (under UI) are analysed using discrete 
hazard model techniques12. The hazard rate out of unemployment into 
                                          
12  See Allison (1982) or Jenkins (1997) for a survey. This type of models is common in the 
analysis of exits from covered unemployment (see, e.g., Bratberg, et al. (2000), Carling et al. 
(2001), Jenkins and García-Serrano (2004), Arranz and Muro (2004, 2007), Van Ours and 
Vodopivec (2006). 
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employment may be defined as the limit of the conditional probability of a 
transition taking place in a small interval dt after time t if no transition occurs until t, 
when that interval approaches to zero. Formally, let iT  be the length of individual i's 
UI spell. Then the hazard for individual i at time t, ( )thi , is defined by the equation 
 { } ii0ii0dtiiii '(t)X(t)expdt
t)T¦tTdttPr(lim)),t(X,t(h θβλ=≥≥>+=θ →  (1) 
where ( )t0λ  is the interval-specific baseline hazard rate at time t, which is 
unknown; ( )tXi  is a vector of time-invariant and time-varying covariates for 
individual i, β  is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, N1i K=  are 
individuals-month observations, and finally iθ  captures unobserved individual 
characteristics that affect the hazard in theory but are unobservable in the data, 
such as acquired skills, attitudes, motivation, inherent ability, and so on. 
Now, we define the probability of surviving through any interval dt after 
having survived the preceding j interval as ( )ijh1− . Therefore, the likelihood 
contribution of unemployed individuals who receive an UI and quit the system 
to work in the jth interval is13: 
 [ ] )h(1htTPr j1ti
1j
tii ∏−
=
−==  (2) 
and if we assume that censoring takes place at the beginning of the intervals, the 
likelihood contribution of unemployed individuals who exhaust their 
unemployment insurance benefit at the start of the jth interval is: 
 [ ] )h(1tTPr jti
1j
i ∏
=
−=>  (3) 
Then, defining 1di =  if individual i's spell ends in a transition to a job (0 
otherwise), the likelihood contribution of the i's individual can be written as: 
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where the discrete time hazard in the jth interval for each individual is: 
 [ ])(t)γ(t)X exp(exp1h itij θ++β−−= . 
This specification allows for a fully non-parametric baseline hazard with a 
parameter for each duration interval, capturing duration dependence. The 
specification of the baseline hazard is very important. A common but restrictive 
approach consists of specifying a parametric form for the baseline hazard. This 
                                          
13  In order to simplify notation, t, X and θ are omitted. 
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approach is rather strong because the assumptions over the form are difficult to 
justify from an economic point of view, and, thus it provokes a misspecification 
problem. Instead, we choose a semi-parametric approach (a piecewise constant 
hazard) by specifying monthly dummies ( )tγ  for the baseline hazard. This method 
presents the advantage of being flexible and it is very common in the literature 
(see Bratberg et al., 2000; Carling et al., 2001; Alba-Ramirez et al., 2007). Finally, 
we assume a finite-mixture unobserved heterogeneity distribution with unknown 
support points14. Then, the likelihood function for any individual may be obtained 
by integrating the following conditional likelihood distribution: 
 )s()s|,(L),,,(L
S
1s
i π=θγβ=πεγβ ∏
=
 (6) 
where θ  are the location points, π  the probability associated to them, and s the 
number of support points. 
5.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1.   General results 
In this section, we present the empirical results from the estimations of the 
model outlined in section 4. Our objective is to compare job finding rates between 
pre-reform and post-reform UI entrants. The reference individual in our 
estimations is a male, blue collar unskilled worker, aged between 26 and 35 years-
old, without family burdens and who enters unemployment reasons different from 
the end of his previous contract. Estimations have been obtained based on the 
likelihood function (6) by the maximum likelihood estimator. For simplicity, we 
                                          
14  A common procedure is to specify a parametric distribution for the unobserved 
heterogeneity such as a normal, gamma distribution, etc. However, this approach has been 
criticised by Heckman and Singer (1984), as the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is 
unknown. These authors show that parametric-form assumptions for unobserved 
heterogeneity might be biased when the chosen distribution is incorrect. This explains why 
they avoid this problem by assuming that unobserved heterogeneity is discretely distributed 
with unknown support points. We would like to underlie that the arguments provided by 
Heckman et. al. (1984) against the use of parametric mixing distributions have been criticized 
by other authors (e.g., Trusell and Richards, 1985). These authors claim that the sensitivity of 
the results to the choice of the mixture distribution was attributed to the fact that the 
Heckman et al. (1984) miss-specified the duration dependence. Anyway, we have also 
estimated a piecewise constant baseline hazard function which controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity through the gamma distribution. Estimations results are similar to those 
presented in the text, and the gamma unobserved heterogeneity is also non-significant (these 
results are not shown, but are available from the authors on request). 
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discuss only the estimates of the entire sample in table 7. The pattern of duration 
dependence is shown in appendix B, and appendix C collects estimation results 
separately for the pre-reform and the post-reform sub-samples15. 
We have experimented with different specifications in order to check for 
parameter estimates sensitivity (table 7). Specifications in columns 3 (model 3) 
and 4 (model 4) allow us to assess the impact of the changes in potential 
duration and benefit levels. They include variables capturing reductions in the 
potential duration of benefits (“UI Entitlement Difference*After change of law”) 
and in UI benefit levels (“UI Benefit Difference*After change of law”). 
To check whether the number of mass points is robust as regards the 
specification with unobservables in the model, three alternative information criteria 
were applied: the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Hannan-Quinn criterion 
(HQ) and the Bayesian info criterion (BIC). Table 6 reports the values of each of 
these information criteria (the preferred model is the one yielding the lowest 
information criterion value). As can be observed, any information criterion leads to 
the same conclusion: in any model specification where individual unobserved 
heterogeneity is taken into account, including two mass points does not improve 
the model fit. Thus, the best model should not include any mass point16. 
Table 6 
SPECIFICATION TESTS FOR MASS POINTS (unobserved heterogeneity) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Information Criteria     
AIC IC IC IC IC 
No mass points 0.23612225 0.23566645 0.23619161 0.23575316 
Two mass points 0.23613339 0.23567721 0.23620236 0.23576297 
(Follows) 
                                          
15  The estimated effects by sub-samples are, by and large, rather similar to those of the entire 
sample, particularly as regards the effects of gender, age, job category, GDP rate and 
quarterly regional unemployment rate (see appendix E). In addition, higher benefit levels have 
a disincentive effect (though not always significant), and the elasticity of the hazard rate with 
respect to UI levels depends on duration in unemployment –interaction terms between the 
level of benefits and entitlement duration have been included. 
16  We have also estimated a third order polynomial specification for the baseline hazard 
function with two support points for the unobserved heterogeneity –which was significant 
(results are not shown, but are available from the authors on request. Although the likelihood 
ratio tests cannot be used to differentiate between both specifications (given that these 
models are not nested) we have finally chosen a piecewise constant baseline hazard function, 
given that it provides a more flexible representation of the baseline hazard function. In 
addition, results with this polynomial are very similar to those shown in the text. 
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(Continuation) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
BIC     
No mass points 0.23634676 0.23598718 0.23640009 0.23605786 
Two mass points 0.23636859 0.23600864 0.23642153 0.23607835 
HIQ     
No mass points 0.23609522 0.23562785 0.23616652 0.23571649 
Two mass points 0.23610507 0.23563732 0.23617598 0.235725 
Notes:   AIC is Akaike info criterion= 
N
)K2l(2 ⋅+− ; 
SC is Schwarz criterion 
N
))Nlog(log(Kl(2 ⋅⋅+−= ; HQ is Hannan-Quinn criterion 
=
N
))Nlog(log(K2l(2 ⋅⋅+− . 
Let “l” be the value of the log of the likelihood function with the “K” parameters estimated 
using “N” observations. 
 
Parameters representing incentive effects are significantly different from zero 
(table 7). Therefore, as is expected, they are important in explaining the 
probability that an unemployed receiving UI benefits finds a job. The estimated 
coefficients for “UI Benefit Difference*After change of law” vary between 0.041 
and 0.054; the estimated effect of the benefit cut on the job finding rate is, thus, 
roughly 5.54 percent. How large is the estimated effect of the benefit cut 
compared to prior studies? Although estimates as low as zero (e.g., Atkinson et 
al., 1984) and as large as 3.3 (e.g., Ridder and Gorter, 1986) might be found, in 
general the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits is 
generally ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 –see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991). Our 
implied elasticity17 of the hazard rate with respect to benefits is around 0.8, 
which lies on the range of previous studies. For instance, in their analysis of cuts 
in replacement rates from 80 per cent to 75 per cent in Sweden in 1995, Carling 
et al. (2001) found elasticities of around 1.6; similarly, Bennmarker et al. (2004) 
reported elasticities of around 0.6 for Sweden as regards changes in the UCS 
along the 1990s; finally, Roed and Zhang (2003) for Norway encountered 
elasticities of 0.95 for males and 0.35 for females. 
                                          
17  The 10 per cent cut in the UI benefit level corresponds to a 12.5 per cent reduction in 
benefits (10/80=0.125). For a 10 per cent increase in the hazard rate, the implied elasticity is 
0.8 (10/12.5=0.8). However, the elasticity of the expected duration is equivalent to the 
elasticity of the hazard rate only in the absence of duration dependence in the hazard –see 
Carling et al. (2001). 
  
T
ab
le
 7
 
H
A
Z
A
R
D
 R
A
T
ES
 F
R
O
M
 U
I R
EC
EI
P
T
. E
N
T
IR
E 
SA
M
P
LE
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 4
 
 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
G
en
de
r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
om
en
 
-0
.6
87
0.
01
7
**
* 
-0
.6
98
0.
01
7
**
* 
-0
.6
83
0.
01
7
**
* 
-0
.6
93
0.
01
7
**
* 
G
ro
up
 o
f a
ge
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
-2
5 
0.
23
5
0.
01
9
**
* 
0.
23
9
0.
01
9
**
* 
0.
23
2
0.
01
9
**
* 
0.
23
7
0.
01
9
**
* 
26
-3
5 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
36
-5
0 
-0
.4
27
0.
02
1
**
* 
-0
.4
21
0.
02
1
**
* 
-0
.4
23
0.
02
1
**
* 
-0
.4
16
0.
02
2
**
* 
51
-5
9 
-1
.1
06
0.
03
3
**
* 
-1
.1
04
0.
03
3
**
* 
-1
.1
01
0.
03
3
**
* 
-1
.0
97
0.
03
3
**
* 
Jo
b 
ca
te
go
ry
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
hi
te
 c
ol
la
r 
sk
ill
ed
 
0.
44
2
0.
03
0
**
* 
0.
44
4
0.
03
0
**
* 
0.
44
5
0.
03
0
**
* 
0.
44
8
0.
03
0
**
* 
W
hi
te
 c
ol
la
r 
un
sk
ill
ed
 
0.
14
6
0.
01
9
**
* 
0.
15
0
0.
01
9
**
* 
0.
14
6
0.
01
9
**
* 
0.
15
1
0.
01
9
**
* 
Bl
ue
 c
ol
la
r 
sk
ill
ed
 
0.
24
2
0.
02
2
**
* 
0.
25
0
0.
02
2
**
* 
0.
24
1
0.
02
2
**
* 
0.
24
8
0.
02
2
**
* 
Bl
ue
 c
ol
la
r 
un
sk
ill
ed
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
Fa
m
ily
 b
ur
de
ns
 (
1=
Y
es
) 
-0
.1
73
0.
05
2
**
* 
-0
.2
44
0.
05
3
**
* 
-0
.1
25
0.
05
3
**
 
-0
.1
95
0.
05
4
**
* 
En
d 
of
 c
on
tr
ac
t 
(1
=
Y
es
) 
-0
.0
19
0.
02
7
 
-0
.0
11
0.
02
8
 
-0
.0
12
0.
02
7
 
-0
.0
06
0.
02
8
 
G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
 r
at
e 
(t
vc
) 
0.
08
9
0.
00
5
**
* 
0.
10
6
0.
00
6
**
* 
0.
08
4
0.
00
7
**
* 
0.
10
2
0.
00
7
**
* 
R
eg
io
na
l u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 (
tv
c)
 
-0
.0
23
0.
00
1
**
* 
-0
.0
05
0.
00
6
 
-0
.0
23
0.
00
1
**
* 
-0
.0
19
0.
00
5
**
* 
T
im
e 
un
ti
l e
xh
au
st
io
n 
(m
on
th
s)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U
I 1
9 
to
 2
4 
0.
06
2
0.
03
8
* 
0.
06
1
0.
03
8
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
(F
ol
lo
w
s)
 
  
(C
on
tin
ua
tio
n)
 
M
od
el
 1
 
M
od
el
 2
 
M
od
el
 3
 
M
od
el
 4
 
 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
P
ar
am
.
S.
E.
 
Si
gn
. 
U
I 1
3 
to
 1
8 
-0
.1
45
0.
03
4
**
* 
-0
.1
47
0.
03
4
**
* 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
U
I 7
 to
 1
2 
-0
.1
85
0.
03
1
**
* 
-0
.1
89
0.
03
1
**
* 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
U
I 4
 to
 6
 
-0
.2
41
0.
03
3
**
* 
-0
.2
43
0.
03
3
**
* 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
U
I 1
 to
 3
 
-0
.1
35
0.
03
1
**
* 
-0
.1
34
0.
03
1
**
* 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
U
I 0
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
Lo
g 
ne
t 
w
ag
e 
 
0.
47
0
0.
05
7
**
* 
0.
48
6
0.
05
8
**
* 
0.
48
9
0.
05
6
**
* 
0.
49
5
0.
05
6
**
* 
Lo
g 
U
I b
en
ef
it
s 
(t
vc
) 
-0
.0
81
0.
07
1
 
-0
.1
17
0.
07
2
* 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
P
re
-r
ef
or
m
 U
I b
en
ef
it
 le
ve
l 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0
.0
10
0.
00
4
**
 
-0
.0
12
0.
00
4
**
* 
U
I B
en
ef
it
 D
iff
er
en
ce
* 
A
ft
er
 c
ha
ng
e 
of
 la
w
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
0.
04
1
0.
01
4
**
* 
0.
05
4
0.
01
6
**
* 
P
re
-r
ef
or
m
 e
nt
it
le
m
en
t 
du
ra
ti
on
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
 
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
 
U
I E
nt
it
le
m
en
t 
D
iff
er
en
ce
* 
A
ft
er
 
ch
an
ge
 o
f l
aw
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
0.
02
5
0.
00
4
**
* 
0.
01
9
0.
00
4
**
* 
A
ft
er
 c
ha
ng
e 
of
 la
w
 
0.
23
4
0.
01
9
**
* 
0.
13
8
0.
03
7
**
* 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
C
on
st
an
t 
-4
.3
02
0.
10
9
**
* 
-4
.6
95
0.
14
4
**
* 
-4
.5
92
0.
12
9
**
* 
-4
.8
45
0.
15
2
**
* 
R
eg
io
na
l d
um
m
ie
s 
N
O
 
YE
S 
N
O
 
YE
S 
D
um
m
ie
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
qu
ar
te
r 
of
 in
flo
w
 
N
O
 
YE
S 
N
O
 
YE
S 
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s 
(p
er
so
ns
-s
pe
ll)
 
72
1,
80
3 
72
1,
80
3 
72
1,
80
3 
72
1,
80
3 
Lo
g 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
fu
nc
ti
on
 
-8
5,
17
4.
87
4 
-8
4,
99
2.
37
6 
-8
5,
20
2.
90
7 
-8
5,
02
6.
67
1 
N
ot
es
:  
 A
ll 
va
ria
bl
es
 d
er
iv
ed
 fr
om
 H
IS
PR
E 
da
ta
ba
se
, e
xc
ep
t 
qu
ar
te
rly
 r
eg
io
na
l u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ra
te
 (
so
ur
ce
: S
pa
ni
sh
 L
ab
ou
r 
Fo
rc
e 
Su
rv
ey
, E
PA
), 
an
d 
ta
x 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
on
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
to
 g
iv
e 
ne
t w
ag
es
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 g
ro
ss
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
(a
ut
ho
rs
' e
st
im
at
es
). 
**
* 
sig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
 le
ve
l, 
**
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 5
 %
 le
ve
l. 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
— 35 — 
Analogously, the reductions in potential entitlement duration after 1992 are 
associated with an increase of 0.025 and 0.019 (models 3 and 4) in job finding 
rates. Therefore, although the effect of benefit cuts on the hazard rate is higher 
than the effect of reductions in UI entitlement, estimates suggest that reductions 
in UI levels and/or in potential UI durations are associated to increases in the 
outflow from unemployment (ceteris paribus). 
In specifications in columns (1) and (2) the effect of the policy change is not 
presupposed to lie on changes in UI levels and potential entitlement. Instead, 
controls for the time until exhaustion and for UI benefits are included, and the 
effect of the reform is then given by the coefficient of the dummy variable 
“After change of law”. As regards time until exhaustion dummy variables, since 
the worker’s reservation wage declines as she approaches the date at which 
benefits expire, the exit rate is expected to increase over the spell of (insured) 
unemployment. This expectation is confirmed in results from the model in 
column (2): the job-finding rate decreases monotonically up to the moment 
when six months remain for exhaustion, and slightly increases thereafter. 
Thus, individuals for whom the potential duration of benefits is long are more 
likely to remain unemployed, and a significant increase in the exit rate from 
unemployment at the time of benefit exhaustion cut is observed. Note, also, 
that relative to the moment of benefit exhaustion (“UI 0”), the job-finding rate 
is significantly lower for whatever remaining period of benefits. These results 
provide evidence of a large spike at the point of benefit exhaustion, which is 
consistent with Lalive et al. (2007) or Card et al. (2007) for Austrian job 
losers. 
As models 1 and 2 in table 7 show, the variable “After change of law” –which 
is the main variable of interest– has a positive effect on the probability of 
workers leaving unemployment. Its estimated coefficient ranges from 0.138 to 
0.234 (see models 2 and 1, respectively). Specifically, the positive coefficient for 
1993 spells suggests that prior to passage of the reform, UI-leaving rates were 
lower than those in 1993. Thus, after 1992 the unemployed present a higher 
exit rate from covered unemployment when compared to covered unemployed 
before the reform. Overall, the rise in job-finding rates associated with the 
reform changes (both UI levels and entitlement duration) amounts to roughly 
14.79 percent. This result confirms the picture given already by the raw hazards 
in figure 2 (after Spain’s UI law changed, the unemployed tended to leave 
unemployment sooner). That is, if an unemployed worker receives a benefit 
under the new system but not under the old, there is an incentive to find a job 
quickly because both the benefit level the and potential entitlement expire 
sooner. 
Note that these overall effects from policy changes (i.e., the estimated 
coefficients of the variables: “UI Benefit Difference*After change of law”, “UI 
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Entitlement Difference*After change of law, and After change of law”) are net from 
macroeconomic conditions, since the evolution of labour market is explicitly 
taken into account by the inclusion of the regional unemployment rate, the GDP 
growth rate and the regional dummies. In fact, changing conditions in the labour 
market also affect the job-finding rate. The quarterly regional unemployment rate 
presents a negative effect on the probability of finding a job. As expected, 
therefore, in regions with higher unemployment rates workers receive UI 
benefits for longer, as they might be receiving less job offers. And the GDP 
growth rate exerts a positive effect on the probability of exiting out of the UI 
system. Given that with high GDP rates firms may create new vacancies and may 
be able to offer better wages, an increase in the exit from unemployment is 
observed. 
As regards the impact of variables related to the UI system, the elasticity of the 
hazard rate with respect to UI benefits is around –0.117 (column 2 in table 7). 
Therefore, a 1 percent increase in UI levels is associated to a 0.12 percent 
reduction in the probability of finding a job. This figure is of the expected sign, 
but it is smaller than the estimates found in the US (Meyer, 1990) and British 
studies (Narendranathan and Nickell, 1989, Narendranathan and Stewart, 
1993), whereas it is similar to the ones found by Jenkins et al. (2004)18. 
Turning to the rest of the covariates, the effects are very much as one would 
expect. Although the dataset lacks variables related to the individual’s 
educational attainment and occupation, it does include a variable collecting the 
workers’ job category with his former employee. This allows us to distinguish 
(in a broad sense) between non-manual and manual occupations (i.e., skilled or 
unskilled workers). As can be observed, highly educated workers –white collar 
skilled ones– enjoy a roughly 56.5 percent higher probability of exiting from 
unemployment than the remainder of individuals. On the contrary, blue collar 
unskilled workers are relatively less likely to exit from unemployment under 
benefits. 
Finally, the demographic variables have, in general, significant coefficients. 
The hazard rate is decreasing with age: younger workers enjoy the largest job-
finding rates, while individuals above 50 years-old suffer the greatest difficulties 
in exiting from unemployment. In particular, when compared to individuals in 
the interval 26-35, among unemployed between 18 to 25 years-old, the job 
finding hazard rate increases by roughly 27 percent, whereas it decreases by 34 
(66) percent for unemployed between 36-50 (50 and beyond) years old. 
                                          
18  These low elasticities encountered for Spain (as opposed to the USA) may be due to the 
fact that many Spaniards who exhaust UI receive a different form of benefit –unemployment 
assistance benefits– which usually pays less than UI. Hence, their sensitivity to changes in UI 
duration may be lower than that of Americans (who receive nothing when UI is exhausted). 
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
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Women have substantially lower escape rates than men. Thus, either females 
are less likely to receive job offers, or they are being discriminated by 
employers, or they may be more restrictive as regards job acceptance than 
males. The difference is around 50 percent. 
To further show the effects from the reform, we calculated the difference in 
exit rates before and after the law changed for a mean unemployed worker (i.e., 
at means of covariates used in specification 1, appendix C); see figure 4. As can 
be observed, before the law changed, that individual had a 2.98 percent 
probability of finding a job within 4 months of becoming unemployed (which is 
the maximum predicted pre-reform probability for his entire unemployment 
period). The corresponding percentages after that month substantially reduce. 
For instance, at the seventh month of unemployment, the estimated conditional 
probability of exiting from UI is only 2.32 percent. After the employment benefit 
law changed, such worker’s probability of finding a job –conditional on 
remaining unemployed up to that moment– within 4 (7) months jumped to 4.75 
(3.72) percent. This implies an increase of 59.44 (60.08) percentage points. 
Thus, a fast exit from unemployment is observed after law changes. This 
difference in exits from UI for the average individual in the dataset remains 
basically constant for the whole period of unemployment under benefits. 
Figure 4 
ESTIMATED HAZARD RATE FROM UNEMPLOYMENT AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OBSERVED 
AND UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY. PREDICTED VALUES ARE OBTAINED AT THE MEANS 
OF COVARIATES FROM TABLE IN APPENDIX C (specification number 2) 
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5.2.   Results by gender 
The fact that women appear to have much lower exit rates than men has 
induced us to estimate separate models for men and women (table 8).The 
reform effects are then, significantly different between men and women: the 
reduction in benefit levels implies a roughly 9 percent higher exit rate for men 
(while being non-significant for women). And the reduction in entitlement 
periods implies a 5.44 percent higher exit rate for women, but it is non-
significant for men. 
The variable “After change of law” has a positive effect on the probability of 
women and men leaving unemployment. In particular, the rise in the probability 
of exiting from unemployment associated with the reform changes is 12 per 
cent in males and slightly higher with a 14 per cent for women. 
The remainder coefficients in table 8 are qualitatively similar to table 7, 
except for the effects (in magnitude) of family conditions and previous wages. 
The effect of family conditions differs for males and females. Males who have 
dependent family members have a lower job-finding rate than males who do not 
and the same happens for females. However, in the latter case, this negative 
effect is much stronger: having family burdens means a 35 percent lower hazard 
rate for women, but only a roughly 14 percent lower rate for men. Apparently, 
having dependent family members is particularly an important handicap for 
women to leave unemployment. Finally, wage in the last job has a positive effect, 
whose magnitude is particularly large for women (when compared to men). 
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5.3.   Results by age 
Table 9 estimates the same specification as that in table 7 for four age 
groups: 18-25, 26-35, 36-50 and more than 50 years-old. The benefit cut 
appears to have a larger positive impact on exits from unemployment among 
the youngest individuals (those between 18 to 25 years-old and 26 to 35 years-
old), and the eldest ones (those above 50 years-old). The benefit effect for the 
latter is around 12 per cent, while as regards the former, the effect ranges 
between 4 and 7 per cent. No significant effect is found, however, among 
unemployed aged 36 to 50 years-old. 
The reduction in potential entitlement duration after 1992 is associated with 
an increase in exits from unemployment for whatever age group. The eldest the 
unemployed is, the higher hazards out of unemployment are obtained. Finally, 
the variable “After change of law” has a positive impact on the probability of 
workers leaving unemployment for whatever age groups. Nevertheless, the 
reform has a lower impact among young individuals, while among the eldest 
ones it exerts a 12 per cent impact (i.e., six times as much the effect on the 
former). 
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5.4.   Results by entitlement duration 
Table 10 shows estimation results by entitlement duration. As can be 
observed, the benefit cut implies a non-significant impact among recipients 
entitled to 6 or less months. However, the benefit cut presents a significant 
impact (of around 22 per cent) among unemployed entitled to 12 months, and a 
positive (though lower in magnitude) effect among those entitled to 24 months. 
In addition, the reform changes do not affect the hazard rate among those 
entitled to short periods (see the estimated coefficient of the variable “After 
change of law” ), and the longer the entitlement period is the lower is the impact 
of the reform. 
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6.   CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we analyse to what extent the 22/1992 UI Reform Act had any 
significant influence on the job finding rates of UI recipients in Spain. This reform 
restricted access to UI benefits at the same time that reduced entitlement 
duration and the level of benefits by a 10 percent. For this purpose, we use two 
random sub-samples of workers who get unemployed and receive UI benefits, 
one of them before and the other after the 1992 changes in the UCS. The 
analysis was performed within the framework of a discrete proportional hazard 
model with a flexible baseline hazard rate controlling for both observable and 
unobservable individual characteristics. 
Our results confirm expectations on the incentive effects arising from the 
abovementioned Law changes. We found that the unemployed after the 1992 
law present a higher exit rate from unemployment when compared to 
unemployed before the reform. Thus, unemployed workers receiving UI 
benefits under the new system are found to have stronger incentives to find a 
job sooner (as both UI benefit levels and their potential UI entitlement will 
expire sooner than under the old system). The overall rise in job-finding rates 
associated with the reform changes (both UI levels and entitlement duration) 
amounts to roughly 15 percent. 
We have additionally found that the outflow from unemployment is 
stimulated both through reductions in benefit levels and in entitlement periods. 
On the one hand, shortening the duration of UI benefits makes the unemployed 
find a job more quickly, as this reduction exerts a significant (though modest) 
impact on the job-finding rate (a 2 percent increase). The reduction in 
entitlement periods implies around 5 percent higher exit rates for women, while 
being is non-significant for men. In addition, unemployed exit from 
unemployment sooner as their age increases Finally, while the benefit cut exerts 
a non-significant impact among individuals with short entitlement periods (6 
months or less), a significant and positive impact on the hazard rate is obtained 
for individuals with 12 and 24 months of entitlement. 
On the other hand, the 10-percent reduction in UI benefit levels exerts a 5-
percent positive impact on the job-finding rate. Our implied elasticity of the 
hazard rate with respect to benefit is around 0.8, which lies on the range of 
previous studies on UCS reforms in other European countries. The reduction in 
benefit levels implies a roughly 9 percent higher exit rate for men while it is 
non-significant for women. The benefit cut had a positive significant impact on 
the exits from unemployment for all age groups, except for workers aged 36-50 
years old (for whom the reduction implies no significant change in the hazard 
out of unemployment). 
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Finally, we have found additional significant disincentive effects associated to 
the UI system. Not only does the probability of finding a job increase whenever 
benefit levels or entitlement periods are shortened, but also the rate of job 
finding when benefit expiration approaches is higher than at the beginning of the 
unemployment spell. These results are in line with previous research, even 
though the incentive effects found are lower than the ones in US studies. We 
should be cautious, however, because this result is not observed for 
unemployed with long entitlement periods (e.g., those near to 24 months of 
entitlement). Indeed, it is mainly unemployed entitled to 6 months or less who 
exit from unemployment as benefit expiration approaches (this is the group 
which mainly constitutes our dataset). 
As an overall assessment, the evidence provided indicates that the Law 
change under analysis had a modest effect on the exit rate from unemployment 
to employment in Spain. Many issues remain open for future research, however. 
In particular, the estimated positive impacts must be weighted against the likely 
additional precariousness of the recipients in terms of job stability in their post-
unemployment periods, due to the shortening of both UI levels and entitlement 
periods. This constitutes a promising avenue for future research in this respect, 
and will allow a more thorough assessment of future legislative changes. 
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APPENDIX A.   Changes introduced in the Unemployment 
Assistance (UA) benefit system through the 1992 reform 
UA is financed through transfers from the public budget and it is granted to 
unemployed persons whose total income does not exceed the minimum wage 
and are in one of the following situations: (1) exhausted UI and have family 
dependents; (2) aged 45 years or older and received UI for at least 12 months; 
(3) did not meet the minimum contribution period for eligibility; (4) returned 
from foreign migration; (5) was released from prison; (6) an invalidity spell 
ended by the labour authority declaring the worker able to take a job; (7) aged 
52 or older – in addition, special UA benefits are available to workers of the 
agricultural sector who have residence in the autonomous communities of 
Andalusia and Extremadura. 
The amount of UA has no relation with the previous monthly wages. A family 
income criterion is also used whereby per capita family income could not 
exceed the SMW. A flat rate equal to 75 percent of the SMW is paid to all 
beneficiaries, except for workers aged 45 or older who received UI for 24 
months. Their benefits vary with the number of family dependents: 75 percent 
of the SMW if one or no family dependents, 100 percent if two family 
dependents and 125 percent if three or more family dependents. 
UA is time limited and it is conditioned on which of the above indicated 
situations the worker is, of being 45 or older, and on having or not family 
dependents (see Table 1). As regards unemployed who had exhausted their UI 
entitlement, before the 1992 reform, those with family burdens had the right to 
receive UA benefits for a period ranging from 18 to 24 months or between 24 
and 36 months, in case they were below 45 years-old or above 45 years old, 
respectively. The non-existence of family burdens implied that only those aged 
above 45 who had exhausted a UI entitlement period longer than 24 months 
were entitled to receiving UA benefits for a period between 6 and 12 months. 
After the reform, there has been no change in UA entitlement period for 
unemployed who exhaust their UI benefits. 
As regards unemployed who receive UA because they have not met the 
minimum contribution period for UI eligibility, before the reform only those 
with family burdens and who have contributed for 3 to 5 months were entitled 
to 3 to 5 months of UA benefits. After the reform, these individuals were 
eligible for these same periods of UA receipt. The only change introduced refers 
to those with family burdens, who have contributed for 6 to 11 months, for 
whom UA entitlement actually amounts to 21 months (in case of having family 
burdens) or to 6 months (in case of not having family burdens). 
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APPENDIX B.   Reforms on the Unemployment Compensation 
System along the 80s and 90s.  
Years 1980 1984 1989 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
Entitlement 
Duration 
3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18,
24 months  
3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 
21, 24 months 
The same as in 1984 
Amount of 
Benefit 
From 0 to 6 
months→ 80% wage 
in prior 6 months. 
From 6 to 12 months 
→ 70% wage in 
prior 6 months. 
More than 12 
months → 60% 
wages in prior 6 
months. 
The same as in 1980 
except for: 
Maximum: 170 % 
SMW without 
children. 
195 % SMW with 
one children. 
220 with more than 
one 
Minimum: 100% 
SMW 
The same as in 1984 
Tenure 
required to 
have access to 
UI. 
> 6 months ≥ 6 months The same as in 1984 
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 
Entitlement 
Duration 
6 + 3 months in 
case that the 
unemployed has 
exhausted UI and 
has family burdens 
The same as in 1980 
but with 18 months 
as maximum 
entitlement duration 
The same as in 1984, 
except for: 
- > 45 years old, without 
family burdens and: 
Exhausted UI ≥ 12 
months → 6 months. 
Exhausted UI≥ 24 months 
→6+6 months 
- With family burdens: 
Exhausted UI ≥ 3 months:
- > 45 years old→ 24 
months 
- < 45 years old→ 18 
months 
Exhausted UI ≥ 6 months 
- > 45 years old →30 
months 
- < 45 years old 24 months
(Follows) 
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(Continuation) 
Years 1980 1984 1989 
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE 
Amount of 
Benefit 
75% of Statutory 
Minimum Wage 
The same as in 1980 The same as in 1984, 
except for: 
- > 45 years old, without 
family burdens and 
exhausted U.I. of more 
than 24 months: 
100 % SMW with 2 family 
burdens  
125% with more than 3 
family burdens 
Tenure 
required to 
have access to 
U.A. 
Not possible From 3 to 5 months, 
with family burdens, 
or more 55 years up 
to the retirement 
The same as in 1984 
OTHERS ISSUES 
Income tax Exempted Exempted Exempted 
Capitalisation 
of Benefits if 
recipients exit 
from the 
system in order 
to enter self 
employment 
Not possible Yes Yes 
Pre-Retirement 
Age 
55 Years-old 55 years-old 52 years-old 
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APPENDIX B. (Cont) 
Years 1992 1993 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE. (U.I.) 
Entitlement Duration 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 
22, 24 months 
The same as in 1992 
Amount of Benefit The same as in 1980 but: 
From 0 to 6 months→ 70% 
wage last 6 months 
More than 12 months → 60 % 
wage last 6 months 
The same as in 1992 but: 
Minimum: 75 % SMW 
without children 
 
Tenure required to have 
access to UI 
≥ 12 months The same as in 1992. 
UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE. (U.A.) 
Entitlement Duration. With family burdens → 21 
months 
Without family burdens → 6 
months 
The same as in 1992. 
Amount of Benefit. The same as in 1989 The same as in 1989. 
Tenure required to have 
access to UA 
≥ 6 months The same as in 1992. 
OTHERS ASPECTS 
Income tax Exempted No 
 
Capitalisation of Benefits 
if recipients exit from the 
system in order to enter 
self employment 
Not possible Not possible 
Pre-Retirement Age. 52 years-old 52 years-old 
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APPENDIX C. Estimates of the baseline hazard 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Spell month 
Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign.
11 -0.028 0.047  0.005 0.048  0.034 0.047  0.050 0.047  
12 0.355 0.045 *** 0.384 0.046 *** 0.411 0.045 *** 0.427 0.045 *** 
13 0.462 0.045 *** 0.492 0.045 *** 0.546 0.045 *** 0.564 0.045 *** 
14 0.493 0.045 *** 0.516 0.046 *** 0.569 0.045 *** 0.581 0.045 *** 
15 0.236 0.048 *** 0.254 0.048 *** 0.290 0.048 *** 0.301 0.048 *** 
16 0.080 0.049  0.099 0.049 ** 0.119 0.049 ** 0.130 0.049 *** 
17 0.254 0.049 *** 0.260 0.049 *** 0.240 0.049 *** 0.242 0.049 *** 
18 -0.035 0.052 * -0.037 0.052  -0.037 0.052  -0.040 0.052  
19 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
10 -0.022 0.056 * -0.026 0.056  -0.032 0.056  -0.036 0.056  
11 -0.078 0.059 * -0.095 0.059  -0.109 0.059 * -0.119 0.059 ** 
12 0.264 0.055 *** 0.247 0.055 *** 0.250 0.054 *** 0.241 0.054 *** 
13 -0.095 0.067 * -0.111 0.067 * -0.117 0.069 * -0.108 0.070  
14 -0.148 0.069 ** -0.170 0.069 ** -0.162 0.070 ** -0.155 0.072 ** 
15 -0.068 0.069  -0.088 0.069  -0.076 0.071  -0.067 0.072  
16 0.228 0.066 *** 0.204 0.066 *** 0.206 0.068 *** 0.214 0.070 *** 
17 -0.271 0.081 *** -0.291 0.081 *** -0.303 0.082 *** -0.294 0.084 *** 
18 -0.264 0.082 *** -0.286 0.082 *** -0.297 0.083 *** -0.289 0.084 *** 
19 -0.296 0.091 *** -0.321 0.092 *** -0.368 0.093 *** -0.360 0.094 *** 
20 -0.154 0.087 * -0.182 0.088 ** -0.218 0.089 *** -0.210 0.090 ** 
21 -0.213 0.089 ** -0.242 0.090 *** -0.194 0.091 ** -0.185 0.092 ** 
22 -0.401 0.100 *** -0.428 0.101 *** -0.383 0.102 *** -0.375 0.103 *** 
23 -0.136 0.096  -0.168 0.096 * -0.131 0.097  -0.121 0.099  
24 0.191 0.084 ** 0.160 0.085 * 0.329 0.084 *** 0.340 0.085 *** 
Note:   This table shows estimation of duration-specific coefficients from specifications in 
table 7. 
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SÍNTESIS 
IMPLICACIONES DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA 
El objetivo de la presente investigación es analizar la reforma del Sistema de 
Prestaciones por Desempleo en España que tuvo lugar en el año 1992. Esta reforma 
endureció las condiciones de accesibilidad de los desempleados a las prestaciones 
contributivas (PC), reduciendo las duraciones potenciales de las mismas así como su 
nivel. Para analizar los efectos de esta reforma se utilizan dos muestras aleatorias de 
trabajadores que empiezan a recibir PC: la primera de ellas antes de la reforma (en el 
año 1991), mientras que la segunda comienza a recibirlas en el año 1993. El análisis se 
ha llevado a cabo utilizando la metodología de los modelos de duración en tiempo 
discreto con especificaciones no paramétricas para el riesgo básico y controlando la 
heterogeneidad observable e inobservable. 
Nuestros resultados confirman que los parados que reciben prestaciones 
contributivas con posterioridad a la reforma de 1992 disfrutan de una mayor tasa de 
salida del desempleo en comparación a aquellos que cobraban las prestaciones con 
anterioridad a la citada reforma. Las tasas de salida asociadas a la reforma (tanto para 
la reducción del nivel de las prestaciones como de la duración potencial) son cercanas 
al 15 por ciento. Adicionalmente, los resultados muestran que la reducción que la 
reforma supuso en cuanto a la duración potencial de las prestaciones contributivas 
implicó un aumento de las tasas de salida de los parados en un 2 por ciento, mientras 
que la reducción del nivel de prestaciones (en un 10 por ciento) supuso un incremento 
de las tasas de salida del paro en un 5 por ciento. Por tanto, en líneas generales la 
reforma sobre el Sistema de Prestaciones por Desempleo de 1992 tuvo un efecto 
relativamente modesto sobre las tasas de salidas desde del desempleo. 
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NORMAS DE PUBLICACIÓN DE PAPELES DE TRABAJO DEL 
INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES 
Esta colección de Papeles de Trabajo tiene como objetivo ofrecer un vehículo de 
expresión a todas aquellas personas interasadas en los temas de Economía Pública. Las 
normas para la presentación y selección de originales son las siguientes: 
1. Todos los originales que se presenten estarán sometidos a evaluación y podrán 
ser directamente aceptados para su publicación, aceptados sujetos a revisión, o 
rechazados. 
2. Los trabajos deberán enviarse por duplicado a la Subdirección de Estudios 
Tributarios. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria, 378. 28035 
Madrid. 
3. La extensión máxima de texto escrito, incluidos apéndices y referencias 
bibliográfícas será de 7000 palabras. 
4. Los originales deberán presentarse mecanografiados a doble espacio. En la primera 
página deberá aparecer el título del trabajo, el nombre del autor(es) y la institución a la 
que pertenece, así como su dirección postal y electrónica. Además, en la primera 
página aparecerá también un abstract de no más de 125 palabras, los códigos JEL y las 
palabras clave. 
5. Los epígrafes irán numerados secuencialmente siguiendo la numeración arábiga. 
Las notas al texto irán numeradas correlativamente y aparecerán al pie de la 
correspondiente página. Las fórmulas matemáticas se numerarán secuencialmente 
ajustadas al margen derecho de las mismas. La bibliografía aparecerá al final del 
trabajo, bajo la inscripción “Referencias” por orden alfabético de autores y, en cada 
una, ajustándose al siguiente orden: autor(es), año de publicación (distinguiendo a, b, c 
si hay varias correspondientes al mismo autor(es) y año), título del artículo o libro, 
título de la revista en cursiva, número de la revista y páginas. 
6. En caso de que aparezcan tablas y gráficos, éstos podrán incorporarse 
directamente al texto o, alternativamente, presentarse todos juntos y debidamente 
numerados al final del trabajo, antes de la bibliografía. 
7. En cualquier caso, se deberá adjuntar un disquete con el trabajo en formato word. 
Siempre que el documento presente tablas y/o gráficos, éstos deberán aparecer en 
ficheros independientes. Asimismo, en caso de que los gráficos procedan de tablas 
creadas en excel, estas deberán incorporarse en el disquete debidamente identificadas. 
 
Junto al original del Papel de Trabajo se entregará también un resumen 
de un máximo de dos folios que contenga las principales implicaciones de 
política económica que se deriven de la investigación realizada. 
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PUBLISHING GUIDELINES OF WORKING PAPERS AT THE 
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES 
This serie of Papeles de Trabajo (working papers) aims to provide those having an 
interest in Public Economics with a vehicle to publicize their ideas. The rules gover-
ning submission and selection of papers are the following: 
1. The manuscripts submitted will all be assessed and may be directly accepted for 
publication, accepted with subjections for revision or rejected. 
2. The papers shall be sent in duplicate to Subdirección General de Estudios 
Tributarios (The Deputy Direction of Tax Studies), Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies), Avenida del Cardenal Herrera Oria, nº 378, Madrid 
28035. 
3. The maximum length of the text including appendices and bibliography will be no 
more than 7000 words. 
4. The originals should be double spaced. The first page of the manuscript should 
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